Much has been made of the relative success of Australian universities in internationalizing their activities and profiles over the past decade or more. Statistics reveal an impressive growth of international student enrollments since the mid-1980s, while the relative cost advantage of Australian fees, as compared with those in the United Kingdom or the United States (but not New Zealand), even if not overwhelming, may have sheltered antipodean institutions from some of the worst effects of the Asian meltdown, at least temporarily.\(^1\) Equally, Australian universities are relatively cosmopolitan workplaces, with teaching and nonteaching staff often bearing qualifications and experience from a wide range of countries, as compared with the staffing profiles of the professoriate in most other countries. Internationalization of programs, both actual and virtual, has also proceeded apace.

Staining this rosy picture, however, is the complex, and contested, phenomenon of globalization, in particular the unfettered global competition of industries and institutions, including the knowledge and culture industries. In particular, while Australian universities have achieved a much more substantial presence internationally over the past decade (particularly in the international student market), this has been achieved at a considerable cost. Unending cost pressures on Australian higher education have seen internationalization accomplished against a backdrop of declining staff-student ratios, with the massive growth in enrollments increasingly being sustained by resorting to marginal funding, the common substitution of tenure with contract and casual (teaching only) appointments, rising managerialism with a concomitant swell of resentment among academic staff, and a never-ending ethos of “do more with less,” all leading to a declining morale among many staff members.

The current article attempts to set these two countervailing processes of


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Going Global? Internationalizing Australian Universities in a Time of Global Crisis

ANTHONY WELCH
internationalization and globalization together in an assessment of the overall character and direction of university reforms over the past decade or more. Successive analyses of the major indexes of internationalization of Australian universities and the extent to which universities and academic work can be seen as having been globalized present somewhat different pictures. Are antipodean universities genuinely internationalized, or are they more globalized?

Mapping Internationalization and Globalization

To some extent, of course, measures of internationalization and globalization depend upon definition. And, just as clearly, there is no overall consensus about either term, most particularly the latter. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the analysis developed here, it is reasonable to cite Jane Knight’s definition of the former: “Internationalization is a process of integrating an international, intercultural dimension into the teaching, research, and service functions of the institution.”

Behind this arguably lies “common sense notions of international community, international cooperation, international community of interests, and international dimensions of the common good,” sometimes associated with ideals of supranational entities such as the United Nations and its charter. Within an internationalist value system, on this account, achieving the goal of an international moral and political order predicated on respect for difference, social justice, and mutual respect within and among nations is a key element, while the domination of the powerful over the weak (e.g., of politically and economically strong nations over those less economically developed, or of the majority of a nation’s populace by powerful politico-economic elites, or of a single ethnic or religious power bloc) is rejected.

Globalization, too, is less problematic to define. While it might be generally accepted that “today’s world involves interactions of a new order and intensity,” the term “globalization” has now become an increasingly

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elastica and contradictory concept and is used with abandon by politicians, the media, and scholars of very different persuasions. Leslie Sklair, among others, has begun to impart some sense into this debate by proposing a useful typology of globalization accounts in which he differentiates among four principal approaches, each with its own heuristics: the world-systems approach, the global culture approach, the global society approach, and the global capitalism approach.6

The first of these approaches, world systems, is familiar to comparative educationists through the works of Immanuel Wallerstein and Robert Arnove.7 One of the first accounts within sociology to use the world as a central hermeneutic, world systems holds that countries can be assigned to either core, semiperipheral, or peripheral status within an overall framework of the world capitalist system. That its genesis precedes the current crop of globalization debates may in part explain its retention of a strongly state-centered approach, though not necessarily its much criticized economism.8

Sklair’s second model, global culture, contrasts with the world systems model in that it prioritizes the cultural over the economic. While one of this framework’s progenitors was Slovenian, the possibility of a global culture was first posed decades ago by the Canadian Marshall McLuhan.9 The changing dialectic of individual and national identity within the face of an emerging global culture, and hence the relationship of the global to the local, or the so-called global-local nexus, is a core concern here. Specifically, the roles of information technology and mass communications are central to this account, although the role of the English language is also key, as is seen below. In principle, people in many parts of the world often see much the same images, and perhaps receive the same interpretations, at much the same time, almost instantaneously: “Moving images meet deterritorialized viewers.”10 In practice, those “diasporic public spheres” are often owned by a Rupert Murdoch or a Bill Gates,11 thereby, in fact, acknowledging the need for a fresh political economy of cultural flows, as also an understanding of the class relations of...
culture.\textsuperscript{12} The dominance of U.S.-based materials within Web-based higher education is also pertinent to this account, once again underlining the dominance of English-language materials.\textsuperscript{13}

Global society, the third model, claims that globalization, a unique stage in world development, is also changing our sense of space and time. Associated with this model are figures such as David Harvey, who claims that globalization is compressing our sense of space-time, and Anthony Giddens, who has employed the phrase “action at a distance” to characterize the supposedly unique way that globalization is enlarging our sense of space-time and who has also argued that “modernity is inherently globalizing.”\textsuperscript{14} Theorists within this framework are partly responsible for such expressions as “global awareness” or “planetary perspectives” becoming more commonplace.

The final model, global capitalism, “locates the dominant global forces in the structures of an ever more globalizing capitalism,” in which, for example, almost half of the world’s 100 largest economies are companies rather than states.\textsuperscript{15} This model breaks free of some of the state-centrist assumptions of traditional sociological explanations, seeing capitalism as both a social and economic system. The model explains, for example, the deindustrialization of formerly key regions of capitalism, the increasingly crisis-prone trajectory of many modern economies since the 1970s, and the development of transnational corporations (TNC) as well as a transnational capitalist class (TCC), which, it is argued, in effect acts as a global ruling class.\textsuperscript{16} There is a danger here, at least in some accounts, of marginalizing the nation-state and undervaluing the strategic choices it can exercise in the face of global capitalism. Nonetheless, if the postwar Keynesian settlement represented, in many states, one of the more systematic attempts at civilizing national capital, this model attempts to grapple with more recent attempts to contest, or at least to civilize, global capital, attempts in which education, too, can play a role, as is argued below.

If such a transnational ruling class exists, then it is by no means restricted


to senior executives of major transnational enterprises but also includes bureaucrats, media owners, and, crucially, politicians. Increasingly, many of these leaders trumpet the same message regarding the inevitability of further economic globalization: in the face of declining civic participation and community, signs of increasing mistrust and alienation among the citizenry fueled by active and increasing gaps between the “haves” and “have-nots” in society, nonetheless, “There Is No Alternative” (TINA).17 As one prime minister put it recently, “In a globalized economy you can’t turn your back on change and reform. It’s going to happen anyway.”18 The implications of global capitalism for intensification of work, including in universities, are treated below.

An interesting paradox here is that, although governments increasingly press ahead with a globalizing agenda that is based on extending the impact of structural adjustment throughout society, they still largely go to elections on domestic agenda items. The articles of international trading charters (North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]/Free Trade Agreement of the Americas [FTAA], Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], etc.) are rarely, if ever, put to voters at the national level, who hence often feel alienated from such agreements over which they have had no say and which are often presented by governments in the form of TINA. This alienation is only increased when subsequent structural adjustments are demanded: “Once a country buys into a global economy, a broad set of decisions is removed from national debate.”19 These decisions often involve educational adjustment, particularly in an era when education is increasingly treated as an engine of economic activity and international competitiveness. In some countries, too, popular alienation is increased by government actions that appear to be more in support of global business interests than the populace that elected them; this results in the increasing bifurcation of society into winners and losers. It is also likely that some of the resistance to ongoing moves to extend a pan-European agenda and institutions across the member states is based on this perceived lack of direct accountability,20 despite Giddens’s point

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20 Giddens’s point that, as consumers, we must take responsibility for eating genetically modified foods fails to consider that the exercise of this choice depends on accurate labeling, which business interests lobby national governments hard in order to prevent. His point about the inherent need for risk management in contemporary society as also the role of the state is too simple (as indeed is much of his analysis of globalization, which too readily simply ascribes many contemporary social phenomena—from funda-
that the European Union (EU) actually represents an extension of democracy, even within its member states (which have to cede some of their sovereignty in order to join and where European courts have acted to safeguard individual rights of citizens).  

Arguably, each of the four accounts described above has merit, and different kinds of evidence are adduced for each. Moreover, it is acknowledged that the four accounts are not totally discrete, but rather lay emphasis on different aspects. Nonetheless, it is argued here that the account of globalization as the extension of global capitalism has the most to offer in terms of understanding contemporary reforms in higher education internationally and, in particular, the internationalization of universities.

At the institutional level, it is not unequivocally clear as to how one measures internationalization. Nonetheless, there would be broad agreement about including three major measures: students, staff, and programs (although no account would be complete without attention being paid to organizational change and associated administrative structures and processes). Prima facie examination of internationalization in the Australian university system yields impressive evidence: strong growth in international enrollments, the significantly international character of Australian academic staff, and substantial internationalization of teaching programs. However, the extent to which this really denotes “a process which integrates an international dimension or perspective into the major functions of the institution,” as Jane Knight and Hans de Wit maintain, is perhaps debatable.

Rationales for internationalizing universities differ according to the source being surveyed, and differences are likely between stated and actual mentalism to the collapse of the USSR—to globalization, without closely enough detailing its internal processes or logic). For Giddens, see his Reith Lectures of 1999 for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which are available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith-99.

21 Ibid. As these words were being written, the German chancellor was putting forward plans for a European bicameral government, although arguably the strongest attachments in Europe still often remain at the local level, and “Europe” may still be a vague or problematic concept for many.


INTERNATIONALIZING AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES

priorities. Knight’s taxonomy of political, economic, academic, and cultural rationales for internationalization of higher education is particularly useful in this context. In her earlier research, for example, Knight found that “the preparation of scholars and graduates who are internationally knowledgeable and competent” was by far the most commonly cited rationale by Canadian professors, followed by the need to “address the interdependent nature of the world (environmentally, culturally, economically, socially) through scholarship.” Economic priorities were ranked relatively low, and even lower ranked was maintenance of scientific and technological competitiveness.

The following sections successively examine international student flows, staff, and programs in Australian universities, assessing the extent to which either internationalism or globalization appear dominant. Given the above definitions, a pertinent question becomes that of indicators: the evidence used to determine the presence of internationalism or globalization at institutional levels. Prime indicators of internationalism consist of evidence of genuine mutuality and reciprocal cultural relations within university internationalization activities, for example, via efforts to integrate international and local students and other noncommercial activities. By contrast, evidence of globalization, on this account, consists of commercialization within international programs and activities, particularly evidence of what has been called academic capitalism, commodification, and marketization. International programs are seen here as a test case of a wider argument about the ongoing economic globalization of education, including its reduction to a form of human capital. Hence, although it is argued that internationalization and globalization pull in different directions, it is also critical to recognize, as is argued below, that important connections exist between the two. Indeed,


26 J. Knight, Internationalisation: From Concept to Strategies, proceedings of the second annual conference of the David C. Lam Institute for East West Studies, Institutional Strategies for the Internationalisation of Higher Education (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University, 1996).

27 J. Knight, “Internationalisation of Canadian Universities,” in Knight and de Wit, eds., p. 105.


30 Currie and Newsom (n. 22 above); N. Burbules and C. Torres, eds., Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2000); McLaren and Farahmandpur (n. 12 above); Welch and Mok, eds. (n. 12 above).
what follows underlines that internationalization is now increasingly occurring within an overall context of the globalization of higher education. 31

The International Student “Market”?

For a decade or more, changing patterns of student ebb and flow have become a notable feature of what is often now simply termed the international student market, although, of course, international student flow has a much longer history. Since at least the medieval era, the phenomenon of students traveling in search of good, or at least well-known, teachers has been a feature of university enrollments. Nonetheless, the phenomenon changed substantially during the twentieth century in at least two respects. The first of these is scale, with the volume of international student travel having increased enormously over the twentieth century. The second change, the development of an international student market, is at least as important, and arguably it is not disconnected from the first, as governments internationally increasingly resile from (fully) funding the massive growth in higher education enrollments. 32 Currently, when international students are mentioned, Australian (and U.K.) vice-chancellorial eyes, darkened by evermore funding cuts, an increasing need to diversify funding sources, and a culture of “do more with less,” increasingly light up, seeing them as one means to strengthen the institution’s bottom line. 33 Indeed, the recent emergence of a market discourse in relation to international students is itself worth noting, as signifying a transition to a logic of economics rather than one based on educational, or social, good.

Substantial changes in the numbers and proportions of students enrolling at institutions in various parts of the world, predominantly the English-speaking world, are detailed below. 34 Such changes relate to moves by certain national

31 R. Yang, Third Delight: The Internationalization of Higher Education in China (London: Routledge, 2002).
33 This is not to say that vice-chancellors and the now almost ubiquitous deputy (or pro–) vice-chancellors (international) who have charge of this matter at Australian universities are not genuinely committed to internationalization; rather, that the fiscal dimension of international students is increasing in importance (although it is also the case that most institutions would probably find it easier to state precisely what their income from international students is than to specify commensurate costs).
34 It is no coincidence that three of the five largest host nations of international students are English speaking: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The other two are France and Germany.
governments, notably that of Australia, and specific institutions, including Australian, to position themselves more strategically to capture more of this market and in some cases to market or export their educational services quite aggressively. Most recent has been the emergence of a relatively new set of players in this market, including Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, Germany, France, Japan, and even China, many of whom have ambitious plans that even the recent Asian meltdown has not blunted.35

This intensification of effort and the entry of increasingly more players into the international student market have begun significantly to shift traditional patterns of international student flow. Perhaps the most obvious example of this diversification of international student flow is the relative position of the United States. While still attracting the lion’s share of international students, growth within the United States has reached a plateau in recent years. Although about 500,000 international students are currently enrolled in U.S. institutions, making the United States by far the largest recipient of such students,36 the proportion of the total occupied by U.S. institutions has slipped, largely due to competitive cost factors and vigorous competition from other countries.37 One of the more notable examples of a newer competitor is Australia.38 Indeed, it is reasonable to portray changes in the flow of international students to Australia and the United States as, to some extent, a reversal of fortunes. During the 1970–80 decade, average annual growth was 8.4 percent in the United States as compared with 2.3


36 The United States has some 32 percent of the total number of international students worldwide, according to OECD data. The next largest educators of foreign students are (in descending order), the United Kingdom, 16 percent; Germany, 13 percent; France, 11 percent; and Australia, 8 percent (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Education at a Glance [Paris: OECD, 2000], p. 180).


Growth in International Student Enrollments in Universities in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 1980–99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>% Growth</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>% Growth</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>% Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,777</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>311,822</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>56,003</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>13,047</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>342,113</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>53,694</td>
<td>−4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>47,965</td>
<td>260.7</td>
<td>386,851</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>77,800</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>69,819</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>449,749</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>197,188</td>
<td>153.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>84,504</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>490,933</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>213,000</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note.—For consistency’s sake, UNESCO’s statistics were used for the United Kingdom, but these were then compared with Department of Education and Science sources. The dramatic rises seen in Australia from 1985 to 1990 and the United Kingdom from 1990 to 1994 are partly an artifact of changed institutional arrangements within each national higher education system. N.A. = Not available.

percent in Australia, for example, yet during the subsequent years of 1980–87, growth slowed to 1.3 percent in the United States, but rose in Australia to 10.7 percent.39 The trend of relatively high growth in Australia has been sustained in recent years despite the so-called Asian Meltdown, but it has been paralleled by a substantial leveling off in the U.S. market; thus, whereas the United States accounted for some 40 percent of all international students in the early 1990s, this proportion shrunk to 32 percent by the late 1990s.40 Table 1 reveals that overall growth in the United States slowed considerably over the 1990s (to an average annual increase of around 1 percent), while Australia saw a massive increase in that decade. Nonetheless, the ongoing effects of the Asian currency meltdown of the last 3 years or so of the twentieth century render predictions that any particular levels of growth will be sustained perilous.

Table 1 underlines how markedly different the rates of growth in international student enrollment were in the decade 1980–99 for three countries: enrollments in the United States grew by 63.5 percent, while the equivalent figure was 263 percent for the United Kingdom and 1,041 percent for Australia (off a very much smaller base, to be sure). The 1970s, particularly in the aftermath of the oil crisis, yielded a substantial influx of students to the United States (and, to a significant extent, to the United Kingdom) from the OPEC nations, particularly from the Middle East. In the 1980s, the economic surge of Japan and the other Asian tigers had a substantial impact


on the United States as well as Australia,\textsuperscript{41} while one of the less well-known effects of the Tiananmen Square events was that tens of thousands of university students fled China to study abroad or remained abroad as a result of more liberal student visa policies adopted in the aftermath of the tragedy. Australia also benefited to a degree from the unexpected and sharp decline in traditional Commonwealth student flows in Britain after the Thatcher administration’s sudden introduction of discriminatory pricing schemes for international students.\textsuperscript{42} In Australia, the proportion of international students had already risen to above 10 percent of total enrollments by the late 1990s,\textsuperscript{43} with the proportion at a few, largely metropolitan, institutions being over 20 percent by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures show that, while the proportion of international students to the total enrollments in the United States was 3.2 percent, the equivalent proportions were 10.8 percent for the United Kingdom and 12.6 percent for Australia.\textsuperscript{44} Table 2 compares the percentage of international students over the past decade or more in the United States and Australia.

The almost fourfold growth in international enrollments at U.K. universities over the past 2 decades and the tenfold growth in Australian universities have been paralleled by a significant relative decline in government funding for higher education, something that has been characterized internationally as something of a fiscal crisis.\textsuperscript{45} American universities, too, indeed, have suffered from a similar problem over the same period,\textsuperscript{46} but there are other reasons why international enrollments at U.S. universities have not increased as swiftly.\textsuperscript{47}

It is not exaggerating the extent of the relationship between increasing international enrollments and declining state support to argue that strategies

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42} See P. Williams, The Overseas Student Question (London: Heinemann, 1981); Welch, “For Sale, by Degrees,” (n. 24 above).
\textsuperscript{43} IDP (n. 25 above).
\textsuperscript{44} OECD, Education at a Glance, pp. 178, 180.
\textsuperscript{45} Altbach and Lewis (n. 32 above).
\end{footnotesize}
by individual vice-chancellors, and by the Australian system in general, to capture a larger slice of the international student market have been largely driven by the need to supplement starkly declining federal allocations. In the Australian case, this serious decline in federal funding for higher education over the past decade or more, accompanied by deliberate strategies to introduce greater competition into the sector, led almost one in four Australian universities to have a debt ratio “of concern,” while overall external debts within the system have “ballooned by $A102 million [US$56 million] to $A276 million [US$152 million] during the past three years.” Indeed, by 2000, federal funding levels had declined to those of 1990, while institutions had increasingly resorted to funding from other sources, in order to counter this serious shortfall. One of the more significant sources of funds with which to replace missing federal allocations has been international student fees, which now account for perhaps US$900 million nationally, and recent national triennial funding reports confirm further moves to capture a yet larger slice of the international student market. Recent goals to increase fee-paying international enrollments by some 50 percent, from around 60,000 in 1997 to around 90,000 in 2001, have largely been met.

The extent to which ongoing financial difficulties of Australian universi-

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50 Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Education, Science, and Training (DEST), Overseas Student Statistics, 2000 (Canberra: DEST, 2001). This figure includes fee income only and represents an aggregate of both internal and “offshore” enrollments, the latter now representing some 48 percent of total international enrollments in Australian higher education. International enrollments in higher education now total some 60 percent of total international students.
sities, leading to concomitant difficulties with library resources, aging equipment, and lack of research funds (see below), limit continued growth is perhaps moot. Some concerns have also been expressed as to quality control, especially in private-sector (nondegree) business or English-language institutions—some of which failed in earlier years, leaving international students stranded.51 Quality assurance in offshore enrollments has also been seen as problematic, at least in part.52 Equally, there is some concern, arguably more in the Department of Immigration than the Department of Education, Training, and Youth Affairs—which, however, instituted an official inquiry into private colleges in September 1999—as to whether all international enrollments are genuine; there have been occasional cases of bogus enrollments or “people smuggling,” largely in the private sector.53 It is still not certain that all Australian universities can always easily identify genuine from bogus enrollments among international students, just as universities in other national systems find it difficult always to be certain.54 However, the recent introduction of a national electronic visa system has substantially reduced this problem.

Once again, this is not to deny the active support for internationalization by Australian vice-chancellors as well as the vast majority of academic and administrative staff, many of whom enjoy the increasing heterogeneity and willingly undertake the extra duties involved in catering to a much more diverse student cohort. Nor is it to deny the wide-ranging benefits to the institutions, including their staffs and their students, that such a rich mix of cultures and knowledges bring. It is necessary, however, to emphasize the fact that the forces of global economic restructuring have largely driven this agenda. This is particularly the case in Australia, which international comparisons show has cut its public sector by more than any other OECD nation in recent years, under the force of economic globalization.55 The TINA justification has been widely used by state and federal governments of all per-

51 Increasing regulation of private language colleges, including the introduction of a bond system, has mitigated this problem.
54 The German system, e.g., has long had considerable difficulties in this regard, and the phenomenon of tens of thousands of students who enroll but do not attend is acknowledged as a significant problem, even among its domestic students. Such students are colloquially termed Karteileichen (sleeping members). The difficulties of the United States in this respect have been apparent for some time. See Somers and Ware (n. 47 above); Holzner and Greenwood (n. 47 above); Shinn et al. (n. 35 above).
suasions for more than a decade to inflict a series of savage cuts on the public sector and to refashion what remains more along business principles.56

The Professoriate

If international student flows reveal clear evidence of being driven by economic globalization, how far does the same hold true for mobility among academic staff? Internationalization of the professoriate also has a long-standing, if less well-researched, history as compared with international student flows, but it is gaining more attention as one instance of rising interest in the mobility of knowledge workers, particularly within a context of globalization.57 The Australian higher education system is relatively internationalized when compared with most other systems, and many have argued that this represents a strength of the system, in that its workers bring capacities and experience from a range of contexts, just as in systems such as Hong Kong, in which such diversity is also prized. Indeed, recent warnings within the latter system against the rising temptation to stock its universities only with home-grown labor would be echoed widely within the Australian system:

It will therefore be possible, and even tempting, to staff the institutions very largely with academics who have no experience outside Hong Kong. It is a temptation which must be resisted. Higher education in Hong Kong, like commerce and industry, depends for its vigour on having inputs from many cultures. If our higher education institutions are to attain and remain in world class positions, if they are to pursue excellence, it is vital that they include members of staff who are as familiar with libraries and laboratories in Beijing, Canberra, both Cambridge and Tokyo, as they are with those in Hong Kong itself.58

In the Australian system, changes in the characteristics of its academic staff—changes in communications, rapid acceleration in the stock of knowledge, the pace of knowledge change, and changing conceptions of the “tyranny of distance”—led to the need to examine the nature of, and arrangements for, international relations among, and mobility of, academic staff. Despite the considerably greater ease and speed of communications and flow of data, by the end of the twentieth century, distance, inter alia, continues to make it important for the Australian professoriate to maintain close, continuing contacts with overseas colleagues in order to keep abreast of contemporary changes and developments, to contribute effectively to international research, and to avoid isolated scholarship.

56 Pusey (n. 32 above); Yeatman (n. 32 above); Currie and Newsom (n. 22 above); Welch, “Education and the Cult of Efficiency” (n. 29 above), and “Globalization, Post-modernity and the State: Comparative Education for the Third Millennium,” Comparative Education 37, no. 4 (2001): 475–92.


58 See French (n. 35 above), p. 7.
Moreover, in an increasingly internationalized context, it is important to know and understand one’s neighbors, partners, and competitors. Australians’ ongoing reexamination of their identity and future as a nation, for example, has led them to plan for greater integration within the Asian region.\(^{59}\) This, in turn, demands a much more sophisticated appreciation of regional cultural, political, economic, religious, and social traditions.

The passage of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) during 1993–94 and the subsequent General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which together gave rise to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which now has 140 signatories, forms a new context for cultural and academic exchanges. Another aspect of this changing context is the rise of regional trading agreements in recent years. Notable among these are the series of agreements between North American and South America, initially the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the United States and Canada, then the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), which embraced Mexico, and most recently the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), which also encompassed South America. Across the Atlantic, the growth of European integration, including the introduction of a common currency beginning in 2002, German reunification, and current plans to integrate selected Eastern European states into the European Union (EU), all denote a more unified and internationalized European economic and cultural space, in which academic and other service activities are likely to play a growing role.\(^{60}\) In the Asia-Pacific region, the founding of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), including its modest educational provisions, is of relevance. At the same time, the extent to which genuine internationalism is currently being contained by the rise of such regional trading blocs, in particular the sundering of the world into three principal economic zones (the Americas, Europe, and Asia), each supported by a cultural and economic infrastructure that includes educational exchange schemes such as ERASMUS/SOCRATES, NAFTA/FTAA, and University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific (UMAP), is of concern.

This “growing diaspora (both voluntary and involuntary) of intellectuals” is a phenomenon of growing importance in Australia, as well as in several other countries.\(^{61}\) Over the past 20 years, several studies have investigated the


extent to which foreign scholars work in Australian higher education, while recent analysis has revealed that higher education is more internationalized than many other professions. A recent survey of the Australian academic profession provided new data and confirmed the picture provided by some of the earlier research findings.

International survey results further confirm that Australia is one of the more internationalized higher education systems: in particular, academic staff have degrees from many parts of the globe. Using place of origin of respondents’ highest earned degree as an index of internationalization, several interrogations of the data were made, and this produced some interesting findings. Figure 1 shows Australia’s relative standing on this question in relation to a select series of other countries surveyed at the same time.

Clearly, “highest earned degree from another country” is not equivalent to foreign citizenship among academic staff employed in individual systems of higher education, since the former measure includes those nationals who have studied abroad. In addition, the figure would understate the number of foreign nationals working as academics in Australia (which now attracts significant numbers of higher degree students from many countries, particularly the Asia-Pacific region) who pursue their higher degree work in Aus-

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Fig. 1.—“Foreign” highest degree, by country. Source: A. Welch, “The Peripatetic Professor: The Internationalisation of the Academic Profession,” Higher Education 34, no. 1 (1997): 323–45; data are drawn from the International Survey of the Academic Profession, conducted by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1996.
Australia and, in some cases, attain a university post. Nonetheless, the measure is an important and often used index of internationalization.

Figure 1 reveals that some 20 percent of Australian respondents were “peripatetic”; that is, they had earned their highest degree from another country. Of those, the United States and United Kingdom provided the bulk, contributing 44 percent and 26 percent, respectively. Another 10 percent came from Canada.66

How does this accord with other research findings? Don Anderson’s 1993 investigation also used location of highest earned degree as an index of internationalization, and it provides some scope for longitudinal comparison in that its data were taken from 1987, whereas the data from the International Survey were collected in 1993.67 Anderson’s measure was different from that of the International Survey, however, in that he compared individual donor nations’ relative contribution to his entire survey, whereas the International Survey examined the contribution of individual donor nations relative to all foreign higher degrees held by respondents. Anderson showed that, in 1987, 15.9 percent of Australian academics’ highest degrees originated in the United Kingdom, while 14.6 percent were from the United States.

As compared with the major English-language countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, no other foreign countries contributed nearly as high a proportion of academic staff to Australian universities, but there are three trends that may change this pattern over time. The first is Australia’s increasing integration in the Asian region, especially the increasing numbers of research students from this region attending Australian universities. The second trend consists of the diminishing importance of the traditional strong links between the United Kingdom and Australia (including in higher education), which is a result of both introduction of higher fees for international students in the United Kingdom and that country’s increasing incorporation into Europe and the EU. To some extent, this is having the effect of dissuading Australian and other scholars from pursuing postgraduate education in the United Kingdom. The third trend is toward higher costs of graduate studies in the United States and the United Kingdom, which, combined with the research strength of many Australian university departments, is dissuading some scholars from pursuing research candidatures in those countries.

Earlier research by Meredith Baker, Frances Robertson, and Judith Sloan used the alternative measure of birthplace and made some allowance for age of entry into Australia.68 Using this index and a somewhat earlier data set, they showed that in 1986, some 41 percent of academic recruits were born in the United Kingdom and Ireland, 22 percent were born in Asia, and 22

67 See Anderson.
68 See Baker et al.
percent were born in North America. Baker et al. argue that this has changed over recent years: Asia and North America have gained, doing so at the expense of recruits from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and New Zealand.

In turn, the research of Baker et al. drew upon an earlier study (*Study of the Labour Market for Academics, 1990*), which began from a number of premises: that overseas recruitment has been an important element of the academic labor market in Australia for some time (25 percent of Australian academic staff who worked in 1986 had been recruited from overseas); that there was likely to be an increased mismatch between the limited internal production of academics and the increased demand for this form of skilled labor in the years leading up to 2000; and that traditional countries upon which Australia drew to supplement its academic staffing requirements (Britain and North America) were likely to be replaced by Asian sources. Most of these assumptions remain broadly defensible.

The extent of internationalization in Australian academia had been sustained, at least in part, by the relative attractiveness of Australian salaries and conditions. The significant relative decline of Australian academic salaries over the past 15 years or so, however, together with deterioration in working conditions, suggests that Australia may now be a rather less attractive venue for academic staff. This trend can only be exacerbated by the Australian federal government’s ongoing failure to fund much-needed academic salary increases, which all agree are both warranted and long overdue.

While detailed findings as to the distinctive qualities of “peripatetic” staff in the Australian survey relative to their “indigenous” peers are not warranted here, it is relevant to indicate that the peripatetic group was on the whole more senior and more highly remunerated, more male, more research oriented, more research productive, and more likely to be in full-time and tenured employment. They were also more internationally active.

In order to understand the reality of internationalization of academic staff, however, we need to acknowledge that it does not occur in a vacuum. The allusion above to the passage of the GATT and GATS underlines the significance of economic agreements in this arena, largely fueled by the forces of global trade, and the desire to extend market forces internationally, including in education. The passage of GATT, for example, was seen as adding impetus to the internationalization of the service sector. While GATT, GATS, and the more recent and hotly opposed OECD-sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)—one of the implications of which could well have been to allow foreign universities to compete in Australia under local

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conditions, with equal claims on government spending—are each trading agreements, they contain profound implications for education. Each poses profound questions for cultural identity, dominance, and penetration, as well as for the globalization of participating economies.\footnote{Croome, \textit{Reshaping the World Trading System} (n. 60 above); World Trade Organization Secretariat, \textit{From GATT to the WTO} (n. 60 above).}

Not only do such trade agreements (where passed) underscore the need to enhance Australia’s knowledge of other cultures directly—rather than at second hand—but they may also give direct impetus to the international movement of academic staff within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region, based on the spread of an international labor market for academic staff. This trend, fostered in part by the inception of the APEC forum, as well as the UMAP scheme, parallels, to an extent, other regional academic mobility schemes, such as those of the European ERASMUS academic staff network and NAFTA, parts of which have helped promote interaction between the U.S. and regional scholars.\footnote{See on Europe, J. Enders and U. Teichler, “Academics’ Views of Teaching Staff Mobility: The ERASMUS Experience Revisited,” in Welch, ed., \textit{The Professoriate}; R. Kreitz and U. Teichler, \textit{ERASMUS Teaching Staff Mobility: The 1990/91 Teachers’ View: Pre-publication Report} (Kassel: Centre for Research on Higher Education and Work, 1995).} Each such scheme is underpinned by relevant trade agreements and increasing regional economic integration. There are at least two implications of this. First, it is arguable that internationalization is, to an extent, in fact becoming regionalized, itself arguably part of a wider process whereby the world is being partly sundered into regional trading and cultural blocs.\footnote{There are, of course, counterexamples, including the recently announced European Commission Australia Academic Exchange Agreement. See http://www. europa.eu.int/comm/education/australia/australia.html.} Second, it is reasonable to argue that the move to greater internationalization of academic staff envisaged by these trade agreements is only a relatively minor part of a much wider push to globalize trade, enhance business, and extend market principles worldwide, including in the public sector.\footnote{See Pusey (n. 32 above); Welch, \textit{Class, Culture and the State in Australian Education} (n. 32 above); Welch and Mok, “Globalization, Structural Adjustment and Contemporary Educational Reforms in Australia” (n. 12 above); Marginson, \textit{Markets in Education}; M. Griffin Cohen, “The General Agreement on Trade in Services: Implications for Public Post Secondary Education in Australia,” \textit{Australian Universities Review}, no. 1 (2000): 9–15.}

Push and pull factors each have some significance in accounting for the dynamics of international academic labor flows. Certainly, the steep decline in Australian academic salaries over the past 15 years or so is one substantial factor.\footnote{S. Marginson, “Australian Academic Salaries: Trends and Relativities,” \textit{Australian Bulletin of Labour} 17, no. 1 (1991): 49–72, and “Academic Salaries in Australia”; Niland.} There are two aspects to this question of salary relativities, both of which are sobering. The first is international. John Niland cites Bureau of Industry Economics research that shows that, if one uses a benchmark of $100 paid to Australian scientists/researchers, the international equivalents are $116 for France, $166 for Hong Kong, $170 for Germany, $158 for Japan,
and $141 for the United States. The other side of the equation is industry relativities, a recent index of which is starkly conveyed in a recent report by the Minerals Council of Australia, which commented upon the “acute shortage of talented academic staff, because university remuneration packages have become hopelessly uncompetitive with those offered in the . . . industry.”

Overall, Niland, then vice-chancellor of one of Australia’s largest and most successful universities, estimated that funding cuts, notably those recently resulting from the aforementioned decision by the federal government to defund much-needed salary increases, might well total some 30 percent from 1997 to 2001. Coupled with a substantial swing toward contract and casual labor, increased workloads, and the relative weakness of the Australian dollar, this could well make Australia a less attractive location for international staff seeking academic employment.

Recent research has underlined that Australian academia is among the most economically productive in the world, producing quality graduates more cheaply than any other of the other four developed nations studied (Germany, the United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), as well as making a substantial contribution to the global research effort. This productivity would have come as no surprise to those working in the system, who have seen student numbers rise from 421,000 to 659,000 in the decade of 1988–97, a rise of some 56 percent. Staff numbers increased by a mere 15 percent over the same period, which has entailed a blow-out in the student-staff ratio from 1:12.3 to 1:16.7, with the prospect of further deterioration. Australian benchmarking data reveal that institutional funding levels are only about 70 percent of their counterparts in Canada and the United Kingdom. These trends provoked even an employer advocate to remark recently of Australian academics: “Something valuable gets lost when they combine high teaching loads, spread across different courses and subjects, attempt to satisfy endless bureaucratic requirements (ultimately imposed by governments), try to care for individual students (many of whom are less well prepared for university study than was once the case), and look with increasing desperation for those pockets of time to devote to scholarly reflection.”

The net effect of these changes has been that, over the past decade or more, numbers of Australian staff, disillusioned by worsening conditions, have been attracted to some mix of better salaries, working conditions, and re-

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76 Niland, p. 13.
77 A significant proportion of this estimate is accounted for by the failure of academic salaries to keep pace with inflation.
search facilities offered by the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, or, in some cases, Europe. While some of the latter group may return eventually, bringing with them valuable international skills and contacts, many will be lost to the system. Either way, it demonstrates that significant elements of the internationalization of the academic profession are increasingly driven by the push and pull of global market forces and not necessarily motivated by values of internationalism.

Programs and Curricula

While national and institutional competition for international students is increasingly keen and academic staff is increasingly part of a global market for skilled labor, a further part of the equation must also be considered: the content of programs. Once again, it is important to underline that these programs are largely located in English-speaking countries, reflecting the emerging global character of that tongue. Clearly, it is particular programs that draw international students to study at particular universities, at least in part. It is equally clear that simply enrolling international students in traditional courses and programs that are designed for local conditions and students is often inappropriate. Comparativists have long pointed out that such unrenovated course designs may not reflect the context in which the knowledge is to be applied by international students. They have also noted the ideological elements of such transactions, which are often very important.

Although definitions of internationalized curricula are neither universal nor uncontested, operational definitions have been developed. A recent survey of all 38 Australian universities elicited some 1,000 international initiatives, including interdisciplinary approaches with an area or regional base, explicitly comparative curricula, subjects with an international focus, and curricula that were broadened by an international component. When asked to provide a list of initiatives, most examples came from business, economics, and commerce (30 percent), while 21 percent came from the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences. Overwhelmingly, the examples listed referred to the Asia Pacific region, and many were recent (1990 or later).

A broad overview of internationalization of curricula was complemented by several case studies of international curricula in Australian universities,

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81 See, e.g., D. Crystal, English as a Global Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); in relation to internationalization, see Yang (n. 31 above), pp. 156-62.

82 Weiler (n. 24 above); Welch, “For Sale, by Degrees” (n. 24 above); Toh and Farrelly (n. 24 above).

tionalisation: Australian Case Studies and Stocktake, OECD/CERI Study (Canberra: IDP, 1995).
TABLE 3
Dimensions and Aims of International Curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developed in an International Setting</th>
<th>Developed in a Multinational Setting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aiming at professional training</td>
<td>Australian National University (ANU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiming at social/cultural integration</td>
<td>Macquarie University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

employing an existing OECD/Center for Education Research and Information (CERI) grid as shown in table 3. Of the case studies treated:

- the Northern Territory University (NTU) example was an Indonesian language studies program (in which Australian arts and education students from Darwin traveled to a university in Timor for a 4-week block of intensive Indonesian language instruction);
- the Australian National University (ANU) example was a specialist MBA program that focused on managing business in Asia;
- the University of Technology—Sydney (UTS) program consisted of a joint double degree in business, negotiated with the University of Humberside in the United Kingdom; and
- the Macquarie case used computer simulation in a course on Middle East politics. Students adopted the role of a prominent leader in the Middle East, researched their character, and then took part in a hypothetical scenario, in which they interacted electronically with other characters (many from universities in the Middle East, the United States, or New Zealand), attempting to maximize their advantage.

Each of the case studies underlined that

- internationalization should focus on mutual benefit and reciprocity (rather than the former “aid” vs. “trade” era);
- “internationalization adds . . . to the curriculum, for both domestic and international students . . . internationalized curricula improve the quality of higher education for Australian students”; and
- an important aim should be enhancing cultural and interpersonal relations, and sensitivity.84

Issues of quality were also felt to have been addressed in the case studies, particularly in terms of increasing intercultural understanding, highlighting (and modifying) taken-for-granted practices, making cultural differences in teaching and learning explicit, and contributing to improvements in teaching and learning practices in participating universities.85 Problems were identified

84 IDP, Curriculum Development for Internationalisation, p. 67.
85 Ibid., p. 69.
in terms of costs associated with programs, which were sometimes considerable and which needed injections of seed funding from government programs. Moreover, equity considerations were considerable, and they were seen “likely to apply disproportionately to already disadvantaged groups.”

At the same time, it is important to recognize that international programs in Australian universities have been criticized at times for being motivated more by financial concerns (see above) than by a commitment to internationalizing either institutional profiles or the higher education curriculum. Australian university programs are vigorously marketed not merely in the Asia-Pacific region but also in many parts of the world. However, as in other countries, it is sometimes argued that, when closely examined, international programs appear, at times, insufficiently adapted to the needs of international students. Moreover, vigorous international marketing may at times gloss over awkward issues of declining resource levels or may promise more than is likely to be delivered.

For some years, disquiet among some international postgraduate students has been evident. In specific cases, international students in masters programs complained about materials that were more than a decade old and that failed to mirror current international developments, while in other cases masters students protested that an M.A. degree program was made up of little more than a collection of undergraduate subjects (with the addition of a thesis) in a new package. “Students elsewhere complained of having to attend lectures in core subjects alongside hundreds of undergraduates. Others were critical of the quality of teaching they received in tutorials.” Once again, it is important to point out that such critiques largely parallel those voiced by a minority of international students in the United States and the United Kingdom over much the same period.

Is there a link between the rising internationalization of Australian university programs and the decade-long decline in government funds that has accompanied increasingly competitive and user-pays practices introduced by successive federal governments since the mid-1980s? “Since the federal government relaxed restrictions on universities charging fees for postgraduate degrees in the late 1980s, there has been explosive growth. Every university in the country now runs such courses, with some setting fees of up to US$27,500 per year. But foreign students, enticed by Australia’s proximity to Asia and low cost of living, have complained of overcrowded campuses, in-

86 Ibid., p. 71.
87 Toh and Farrelly.
88 This is by no means a simple matter to resolve, as attempts to tailor courses to international contexts have sometimes been criticized by international students, some of whom feel that this difference represents a less than equal form of education.
90 “Federal Funds Fall as Private Income Soars” (n. 49 above).
adequate library facilities, low teaching standards—and out-of-date course notes. 91

The problem, while by no means unique to Australia, is arguably aggravated by the increasingly severe pressure on university resource levels, which has driven institutions to implement aggressive marketing campaigns, without always paying proper regard to whether students are getting what they pay for. As Niland argues, “my experience with full fee-paying international students [is] that, when a student contributes directly to the cost of their education, . . . they become more alert to the quality of that education. Is the lecturer well-prepared; does she or he arrive on time; is the exposition clear and interesting; is the Faculty Office still open at 7 p.m. for enquiries when the lectures finish; is the assessment true and proper?” 92 Clearly, curriculum relevance and significance should be added to that list, and if student satisfaction levels among international cohorts remain largely high, it is largely because of the dedication of the students themselves, together with academic and administrative staff, who struggle to maintain integrity and standards of service in the face of increasingly difficult material circumstances. 93

Internationalization and Globalization

The evident progress in internationalizing Australia’s universities in recent years across a variety of fronts (of which only students, staff, and programs have been sketched above) seems impressive. There is no doubt that great strides have indeed been made and that Australia now stands comparison with the most developed higher education systems in terms of the extent of its international activities.

As was argued above, however, nothing occurs without a context, and it is important to recognize that the changes sketched above have been only one index of change within Australian higher education and the Australian state more generally over the past decade or more. Why is it that the rapid growth of enrollments by international students at Australian universities has been fueled by enthusiastic and at times aggressive recruitment campaigns by staff from university international offices, deans, and others? And why so markedly over the past decade or more? Why have universities developed ever more sophisticated and expensive (niche) marketing techniques to peddle programs throughout the Asia Pacific region and beyond, underpinned by sometimes hyperbolic advertising campaigns? Such strategies are not limited to Australia, of course, and studies of the marketization of higher edu-

91 Maslen, p. 27.
92 Niland (n. 69 above), p. 4.
93 This is not to deny the issue of cultural globalization contained in the argument that, because so much material on the Web is not merely in the English language but also originates from the United States, this is having a distorting effect on distance education programs. See Wilson et al. (n. 13 above).
cation have discerned similar discourses elsewhere, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom.94

The explanation advanced here has much to do with the complex, convoluted, and contested phenomenon of globalization. Mouthing such mantras as “action at a distance” helps little in uncovering the real effects of globalization.95 More useful are taxonomic accounts such as that by Sklair noted above. Sklair goes on to argue that global capital provides the best overall account of the phenomena. Analysis of contemporary reforms in higher education tends to support this judgment.96 Phillip Jones, too, concurs in assessing the phenomenon largely as “the organisation and integration of economic activity at levels which transcend national borders and jurisdictions” and goes on to underline that this is not the postwar Keynesian style of economics, but rather a much more deregulated, laissez-faire form (often termed neoliberal) that is hostile to government intervention: “global economic integration along free market lines transcends the taxation and regulatory disciplines for which national governments are conventionally held accountable.”97 What is envisaged here is “a demilitarised world in which business activity is primary, and political power has not other tasks than the protection of the world free-trading system.”98 This largely unfettered growth of a neoliberal business agenda, and the intensification of global competition, is leaving more and more people behind in the race for employment, while fracturing the workforce. On the one hand is the minority of well-paid, full-time employees while, on the other hand, is the majority of contract, part-time, or casual staff, who are often denied many of the benefits that their full-time colleagues enjoy. Increasingly, we are told that this is inevitable, that the never-ending demands of global competition mean that we must simply accept rising levels of semipermanent unemployment and that next century will herald the 20:80 society, in which as little as only 20 percent of the population may be required to be fully employed in order to supply the needs of the entire economy. These skilled “knowledge workers” will, in turn, be surrounded by a huge pool of under- and unemployed who are on more or less marginal incomes.

The extension of global capitalism is also substantially restructuring the world of work. The lucky few to survive this winnowing process will work


95 Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (n. 14 above).

96 M. Miyoshi, “‘Globalization’ Culture and the University,” in Jameson and Miyoshi, eds. (n. 6 above), pp. 247–72; Currie and Newsom (n. 22 above); Welch and Mok, “Globalisation, Structural Adjustment and Educational Reforms in Australia” (n. 12 above), and “Globalization, Post-modernity and the State”; Welch and Mok, “Conclusion: Deep Development or Deep Division?” (n. 22 above).

97 Jones (n. 5 above), p. 13.

intensively, but without needing central direction, in devolved work units and often in teams rather than individually.\(^{99}\) Those public-sector workers to survive are increasingly being pressed to adopt a business ethic, to be customer focused, and to implement such modish managerialist mantras as Total Quality Management (TQM).\(^{100}\) Ideally, they should be strongly committed to the goals or vision of the institution, but they may come to feel increasingly alienated by the ever-rising demands upon their time, loyalty, and skills, with little or no added rewards:\(^{101}\) “Overall, while being asked by academic administrators and policy makers to do more with fewer resources, faculty are being told they should not be expected to be rewarded—financially or otherwise—for meeting ever increasing demands.”\(^{102}\)

Such definitions lead us to examine critically the impact of spreading global communications, internationalized economies, and a hypercompetitive business ethos, both in the private and public sector. This notably includes the changing face of Australian higher education, which has been substantially refashioned according to such globalizing agendas. It is to these specific effects that I now turn.

The globalization of trade, and most particularly of finance, is perhaps one of the more fundamental aspects of the phenomenon, and it poses dilemmas for nation-states around the world. The ballooning dimensions of this trend (whereas in the early 1970s some US$15 billion of currency was traded in an average day, this had risen to around US$1,300 billion by the mid-1990s) means that we have already moved in the direction of what Kenichi Ohmae has characterized as a borderless world.\(^{103}\) Griffin Cohen cites WTO figures to show that cross-border trade in services had reached US$1,350 billion by 1999, or 20 percent of total cross-border trade.\(^{104}\) In effect, this new “financescape” denotes an increasing tension between the political unit of the nation-state and the global economy.\(^{105}\) The implications for the public sphere are increasingly clear: “While the world economy operates increasingly uncoupled from any political frame, national governments are restricted to fostering the modernisation of their national economies. As a


\(^{101}\) Gee et al.

\(^{102}\) Altbach and Lewis (n. 32 above), p. 13.


\(^{104}\) To this, presumably, must be added the more than US$600 billion that the International Monetary Fund estimates is the total of money laundered on the international financial system in the form of profits from illegal trade in drugs, etc. See “Make Crime Pay for Development,” *Financial Times*, September 2, 2001.

\(^{105}\) Appadurai (n. 5 above).
consequence, they have to adapt their national welfare systems to what is called the capacity for international competition.\(^{106}\)

The rise of cross-border trade in services, notably in higher education, is also of growing concern. The GATS agreement, for example, “covers not just cross border trade but every possible means of supplying a service, including the right to set up a commercial presence in the export market.”\(^{107}\)

Hence, GATS is not merely the first global agreement to “provide legally enforceable rights to trade in all services” but also the world’s first multilateral agreement on investment.\(^{108}\) This agreement applies to all national systems in which any private providers operate, thus including Australia, where only two or three small private universities exist. The restriction of government subsidies to domestic private providers is construed as a barrier to trade in education by the WTO.\(^{109}\) The agreement is also legally binding upon signatories, each of whose profile commits specific sectors to the agreement.\(^{110}\) Australia, for example, has committed itself to trade in higher education services, whereas both the United States and Canada exempted cross-border trade in this sector.

In light of evidently growing resistance to globalization and the recent success of opposition to the passage of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), GATS has even been moved to counter what it sees as such misguided opposition.\(^{111}\) So-called barriers to increased trade in educational services include the existence of government monopolies, exclusion of international institutions from degree-granting status, moves to limit foreign direct investment (FDI) by international providers, and differential treatment of international students (e.g., their exclusion from travel concessions or financial assistance). The first-named barrier listed above is particularly interesting, underlining a clear commitment to fostering private-sector institutions’ claims on the public purse: “These agreements are about creating and expanding private markets and, whenever possible, identifying and eliminating government actions which hinder the growth of the private sector.”\(^{112}\)

In higher education, the WTO has famously noted that there are doubts

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107 Griffin Cohen (n. 74 above), p. 10.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., p. 11.
110 Each of the 21 signatories has committed itself to cross-border trade in education in specific sectors, such as higher education, adult education, etc. See table 1 in Griffin Cohen.
112 Griffin Cohen, p. 12.
about “whether higher education can be profitable for private investors without public subsidies.”

Despite the voluntary nature of each country’s commitment—the fact that no obligation exists on signatories to allow foreign supply of any particular service or to provide subsidies to foreign service suppliers that it currently offers to domestic suppliers—Article XIX effectively commits signatories to successive rounds of negotiations, aimed at further liberalization, and it has an in-principle limit of 10 years on exemptions to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. Mooted forms of educational trade include Cross-Border Supply of services (such as distance education), Consumption Abroad (mainly international students), Commercial Presence (e.g., foreign universities establishing courses or institutions in another country), and Presence of Natural Persons (transborder movement of individuals involved in providing educational services).

The permeability of political borders by external economic influences has already been largely accomplished, often with the collusion of national regimes interested in making their economies more “lean and mean” (modernized, pared down, efficient, and competitive). In so doing, of course, substantial trade-offs are effected in wages, employment, and working conditions. Massive transnational industrial conglomerates, with budgets larger than those of many nation-states, are able to some extent to play off one federal state (or nation) against another to achieve the best deal, often leading to low wages, minimal employment levels, weaker unions, reduced taxation regimes, or deregulation of environmental or health and safety legislation and guidelines. Indeed, the globalization of working conditions is another prominent feature of this often misunderstood phenomenon:

“If there is not a global labour force, there is a certain degree of globalization of working conditions. That is, with increased mobility of capital, and cross border networking of trade and investment, . . . firms may choose to invest in other countries where labour costs are lower, unions are less resilient, and more important, flexibility of labour is the rule. They increasingly tend to do so. . . . With new technologies and with the diffusion of


114 See World Trade Organization (WTO), “GATS–Fact and Fiction.” Here, too, the sting in the tail alludes to ongoing negotiations to develop “the necessary multilateral disciplines” (p. 9).

115 The financial industry is an example. The recent merger between U.S. financial giants, Bank of America and Nations Bank, e.g., has yielded a huge financial conglomerate with an overall budget larger than that of many national economies. Telecommunications has proven to be another fertile field for massive mergers between companies, and this has global implications, including for education. Sklair’s 1999 data, e.g., show that of the top 100 global financial entities, 47 are companies. See Sklair, “Sociology: Issues and Debates,” (n. 6 above).
The early years of the Hawke federal government in Australia in the mid-1980s accomplished precisely this lowering of working conditions and wages, especially in the public sector, albeit with the grudging agreement of the labor movement, under the guise of the so-called Accord, an agreement between labor unions and the federal government. Since then, the agenda has been pursued with increasing vigor by state and federal governments of either hue, using global competition as a rationale for ongoing cuts to the public sector and the aggressive refashioning of the residue along into lean-and-mean, competition-oriented, customer-focused enterprises.

Few foresaw, in the early years, the extent to which social and economic policies would become vulnerable to the whims and greed of international hedge funds, currency speculators, and the like. In turn, national autonomy became more circumscribed, and the capacity of national and state governments to intervene in the business cycle, and especially to sustain the social wage, became increasingly limited: “Once a country buys into a global economy, a broad set of decisions is removed from national debate.” Authors such as Philip Cerny and Anna Yeatman have characterized this transformation as a move from a welfare to a competition state, in which the only licensed forms of intervention in the economy by the state become those that enhance national economic competitiveness. Although calls for some reregulation of the financial markets are becoming increasingly commonplace (see below), it is not readily seen how this might be accomplished at a global level, while even some of the most successful currency speculators predict that the crisis will deepen before being resolved: “If the global capitalist system survives the present period of testing, this period will be followed by a period of further acceleration that will carry the system into far-from-equilibrium territory, if it is not there already.”

One of the more dramatic effects of the progressive globalization of the economy has been on the Australian social policy framework, with an emphasis on increasing individual and system performance and so-called effi-

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119 Pusey (n. 32 above); Cerny, *The Changing Architecture of Politics* and “Paradoxes of the Competition State” (both in n. 32 above); Yeatman (n. 32 above).
A climate of “do more with less” has grown, particularly in the public sector, which has been substantially refashioned along supposed business lines. This economistic credo has substantially reshaped social institutions, including universities. Public-sector wages have declined alarmingly, and in higher education they are no longer adequate to attract the range of high-quality international staff that watered the fields of Australian universities in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, they are helping propel increasing numbers of quality researchers to seek greener pastures overseas. This problem was compounded in 1996, when the newly elected federal Liberal (conservative) government declined to fund the salary raise that all agreed was necessary to restore some wage parity to academic staff. Hence, hard-pressed university budgets—much of which are taken up with salaries—had to be raided in order to fund the needed raise. In turn, vice-chancellors pressed staff for more so-called efficiency gains in the subsequent rounds of wage bargaining at the institutional level, to be traded for wage raises, further increasing pressure for academic and administrative staff to take on even higher workloads, with even fewer resources.

Library resources have declined alarmingly over the past decade or more, and the declining value of the Australian dollar has seen significant cuts to journal subscriptions and book orders. Research monies have also declined with only recent modest signs that this trend is to be redressed: “A declining proportion of funding is being spent on new capital items, and the number of journal and monographs being purchased by research libraries has declined. For example, in the period 1990–91, universities spent just over 16 percent of their research and development on fixed assets, such as land, buildings and other capital items. By 1998, this proportion had declined to below 7 percent. Now it is estimated that universities and public research organisations typically spend only 5 percent of their total budgets on new capital items, which is barely sufficient to cover the rate of depreciation.”

Indeed, national research and development (R&D) expenditure barely totals more than that spent by IBM, while the level is not merely significantly below the EU average but also has fallen in recent years, a trend running

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122 See Welch, “Education and the Cult of Efficiency” (n. 29 above), and “Globalization, Postmodernity and the State” (n. 56 above); J. Enders, “A Comparative Perspective on Academic Staff in Europe,” in *Academic Staff in Europe: Changing Contexts and Conditions*, ed. J. Enders (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2001), p. 2.

123 Pusey; Yeatman; and Welch, *Class, Culture and the State in Australian Education* (n. 32 above).

124 Marginson, “Australian Academic Salaries” (n. 75 above), and “Academic Salaries in Australia, 1967–1990” (n. 69 above).

125 “Research Spending Plunges” and “Sorry Story of Scholar v. the Dollar” (both in n. 80 above); Welch and Mok, “Globalisation, Structural Adjustment and Contemporary Educational Reforms in Australia” (n. 12 above).

126 The extent to which this inexorable push for more output with lessening input levels yields genuine efficiency increases is, of course, moot: see, among others, Welch, “Education and the Cult of Efficiency.”

counter to the OECD trend. Of all 24 countries surveyed, for example, Sweden deploys the highest proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP), some 2.7 percent, on R&D. The comparable figure for the United States is 1.9 percent, while it is 1.5 percent for Germany, 1.25 percent for the United Kingdom, and 1.25 percent for Canada. Australia’s percentage, at 0.8, is by any measure extremely low, less than that of all major developed economies, with the exception of Italy. Equally, its performance over time, relative to its OECD counterparts, gives no greater cause for confidence, with a showing that is not merely consistently much lower than the OECD average but also one that has fallen sharply since the mid-1990s, in opposition to the OECD trend. Just as troublesome is the long-standing failure of Australian business to invest in R&D; the proportion of total R&D investment contributed by Australian business is the seventh lowest among 24 OECD nations studied recently. Worse, this already low rate is continuing to fall, while the OECD average is rising.

Against this backdrop, it is no surprise to find that basic research has been eroded, and success rates for the national Australian Research Council (Large) Grants scheme have now declined to less than 20 percent, provoking widespread cries that far too many first-rate applications are being routinely refused due to lack of resources. Compounding this problem is the fact that the average grant is relatively small: “The average size of ARC grants for basic research is US$30,000, an amount which is inadequate to meet the full direct costs of the research. In the United States, the average size of successful grants is equivalent to US$93,000, while in the United Kingdom grants range between US$106,500 and US$237,000 (including funding for research infrastructure). . . . It is imperative to increase support for national research grants schemes. . . . Funding available for ARC competitive grants (should) be doubled over five years.”

It is thus unsurprising that this same recently commissioned national report called for funding to be doubled over 5 years. Despite government exhortation, the long-standing failure by industry to invest in research, indicated above, is clearly not making up the funding difference, especially in basic research. Despite evidence that Australian graduates are being produced at a lower cost than in the United Kingdom, Canada, or the United States, there is little sign that the ongoing funding decline will be arrested; indeed, it is clear that both major political parties broadly acquiesce in this trend, albeit to differing degrees. By contrast, for example, “other countries, including Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Singapore, the United

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128 Ibid., p. 12
129 Ibid., p. 13.
130 Welch and Mok, “Globalisation, Structural Adjustment and Contemporary Educational Reforms in Australia” (n. 12 above).
131 Innovation Summit, p. 16. All amounts have been converted to U.S. dollars.
Kingdom, and the United States, have recently announced significant increases in their level of public investment in research.\textsuperscript{132}

The United States, for example, increased federal funding for research and development by some 53 percent from 1993 to 2001, while the United Kingdom has substantially increased R&D funding, including that for university infrastructure, and Japan committed itself to doubling its investment in basic research over the years 1996–2000. Nations as diverse as Finland, Ireland, and Singapore have all responded vigorously to the perceived need to invest more in R&D.\textsuperscript{133}

Under such globalizing influences, academic work within Australian universities has come under increasing strain, this with the consent of federal ministers of education of either political persuasion, who have pressed for such changes. As one minister of education argued recently, "To survive and prosper in rapidly changing world, universities must embrace the marketplace and become customer-focused, business enterprises."\textsuperscript{134} In essence, this has meant support for market primacy, performativity or a heightened stress on systemic efficiency,\textsuperscript{135} increased use of the technology of performance management and performance indicators, sharply decreasing rates of tenure, and increasing casualization of academic labor.\textsuperscript{136}

Globalization, and the new media that is often taken to be emblematic of it, is also having a significant impact on pedagogies in higher education.\textsuperscript{137} Here again, however, the economic model of globalization threatens to overwhelm prospects for more creative and more democratic pedagogies in higher education. A move toward Web-based learning and teaching is intensifying in Australian universities, with little evident lessening of workload to compensate for the substantial increase in demands upon time and skills. Although no Australian universities have yet moved to require staff to transfer

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p. 15.


\textsuperscript{136} Sheehan and Welch, “The Australian Academic Profession” (n. 63 above) and “The International Survey of the Academic Profession: Australia” (n. 64 above).

their courses to the Web-based format, the growing demands of international competition have given greater urgency to this cultural shift, not always with full consultation or the informed consent of academic staff. In the context of an often dramatic increase in Australian Web-based program offerings, many Australian academics have read David Noble’s incisive critiques with a mixture of interest and concern. In his recent series, “Digital Diploma Mills,” Noble, a Canadian history professor, provides a timely warning of what the digitized future may hold for Australian universities. He cites two examples, one from the United States and one from Canada, that underline the direction of new media in higher education and clearly indicate the dangers for academic staff of such a move. So far, only a few campuses in Australia have moved as vigorously in this direction, notably some in Queensland and Western Australia; yet there is no reason to expect that teaching staff will be exempted from the pressure to go on line.

Both of Noble’s examples raise key issues of intellectual property and marketization of programs of direct relevance to Australian universities. The University of California, Los Angeles, launched an “Instructional Enhancement Initiative,” the effect of which was to require all academic staff members in the Arts and Sciences division to mount their courses on the Web by the beginning of the fall quarter. They did this without any real prior consultation, abrogating the intellectual property rights of associated academics. The reason for such a preemptive move was to position the university to market its courses more effectively, nationally and internationally. Indeed, in a parallel move, “in partnership with several private corporations (including the Times Mirror company, parent of the Los Angeles Times), . . . UCLA has spawned its own for-profit company, headed by a former UCLA vice-chancellor, to peddle online education (the Home Education Network).”

In Canada, at much the same time, full-time academics at York University in Toronto (Canada’s third-largest university) recently went on a 2-month strike, the longest in English Canadian history, in order to prevent just such a requirement being imposed on them and as a response to unilateral actions by management, which “invited private firms to permanently place their logo on a university online course, in return for a $10,000 contribution to courseware development. As at UCLA, the York University administration spawned its own subsidiary (Cultech), directed by the vice president for research and several deans, and dedicated, in collaboration with a consortium of private sector firms, to the commercial development and exploitation of online education.”

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140 Ibid.
The strike by academics at York, whose chief slogan was “The Classroom versus the Boardroom,” was successful, resulting in “formal contractual protection against precisely the kind of administrative action being taken at UCLA.”

The two North American cases reveal that, despite the rhetoric about flexible delivery and more creative pedagogies, the global strategy of electronic marketing of higher education is motivated principally by cost considerations (since, once having mounted the course on the Web, the push is to recoup costs by marketing it as widely as possible). Rather than having any real interest in education itself or in democratizing higher education by opening up access to wider groups, the new learning technology is exposed as “but a vehicle, and a disarming disguise.” Moreover, there is a real concern about the costs in terms of workload and finance. Evidence so far reveals not merely that the “limitless demands upon instructor time” but also that “vastly expanded overhead requirements—equipment, upgrades, maintenance, and technical and administrative support staff—cost more, not less than traditional education.”

Australia’s long-standing, successful record of distance higher education, originally a product of the need to provide higher education to scattered rural communities that were often far from the nearest campus, has in recent years been reshaped, in part by the recognition of its potential to recruit fee-paying international students. On-line technology has added to this pressure substantially: the federal government has commissioned two major reports on virtual higher education, including the competitive position internationally, and it has also provided grants to selected institutions to develop on-line courses.

Significant issues raised by Noble are paralleled by Australian developments. A recent nationwide survey, for example, revealed that some 72 percent of academic staff reported using computer-assisted course delivery, while 46 percent claimed to be using distance-based learning, often without much training in the new methodologies and techniques. This has led to some

141 Ibid.
143 Ibid., p. 6. Noble cites evidence by K. Green of the Campus Computing Project: “We have yet to hear of an instance where the total costs (including all realistically amortized capital investments and development costs, plus reasonable estimates for faculty and support staff time) associated with teaching some unit to some groups of students actually decline, while maintaining the quality of learning.”
claims that technology is driving pedagogy.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite some innovative uses of the net to link national students with their international counterparts (reported above), expressions of concern about cost pressures and increased international competition reveal the rise of market-based considerations, with one vice-chancellor returning from an overseas conference recently to claim that, if Australian institutions wished to maintain their competitive position internationally, they need “to act quickly to be at the forefront of opportunities emerging from borderless education.”\textsuperscript{147} A recognition of the competition from overseas consortia, such as that involving the London School of Economics, Stanford University, Columbia University, Carnegie-Mellon University, and the University of Chicago, helped provoke two of Australia’s better-known programs at neighboring institutions not merely to combine forces but also to “think hard about joint ventures. We’ve been able to use the net in six of our units, but its an expensive business, and as the power of PCs and the size of the pipes improves, we just won’t be able to develop the quality of material the market will expect by ourselves.”\textsuperscript{148}

Additional competition is also occurring through plans by newer, for-profit providers such as Phoenix University, which has announced ambitious plans for “a string of campuses around the world,” one of which is in Canada and is already drawing students away from traditional universities.\textsuperscript{149} Australian vice-chancellors, while still enthusiastic proponents of Web-based international programs, are rapidly becoming more critically aware of the “real costs of on-line learning,” in particular that it can be both “more intensive and more costly than conventional teaching in classroom situations.”\textsuperscript{150} Nonetheless, the continuation of such breathless pronouncements as “[in] a huge global market of people wanting overseas qualifications, but not able to afford years of study in another country . . . quality and competitive price will be a winner” are an ongoing cause for concern.\textsuperscript{151}

Going global is not a one-way trade, however, and the issue of overseas competition has also raised new issues of accreditation and quality control, as the recent attempt to establish a virtual university in Australia by an overseas

\textsuperscript{146} C. McInnis, \textit{The Work Roles of Academics in Australian Universities} (Canberra: DETYA [EIP], 1999).
\textsuperscript{147} “Substance the Key Factor in New-Style University,” \textit{Australian}, May 7, 2000, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{148} “Students Attracted by Dot Com Degrees,” \textit{Australian}, March 22, 2000, p. 33. Much the same rationale is behind the development of such international consortia as Universitas 21, which involves two major Australian universities with partners in the United Kingdom and the United States.
\textsuperscript{149} Altbach, “The Crisis in Multinational Higher Education” (n. 37 above), p. 4. In this sense, the conclusion that these newer providers, such as Phoenix, who principally focus on the adult, employed learner (Cunningham et al., \textit{The Business of Borderless Education}), will not compete much with the traditional universities, seems unduly optimistic. It is, of course, germane to point out that Phoenix University is able to contain the costs of its programs, since it has no tenured staff and few if any facilities such as libraries, while its staff is not expected to undertake research.
\textsuperscript{150} “Real Costs of On-Line Learning,” \textit{Australian}, July 5, 2000, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
provider illustrates clearly. The effort by Greenwich “University” to deliber-
ately site itself on an island off the eastern coast of Australia may well have
been fueled by the desire to escape stringent and detailed accreditation
procedures at the state level, by appealing directly to the Commonwealth
(federal) government. The subsequent furor provoked by that government’s
conspicuous failure to institute rigorous checks of the quality of staff as well
as of the teaching and research facilities merely intensified the push for a
uniform, national approach to quality control and accreditation procedures
for new institutions, including overseas providers wishing to offer programs
by distance.152

Australian moves to provide on-line distance higher education interna-
tionally are generally supported by staff, institutional leaders, and govern-
ment—albeit perhaps for different reasons. Financial support by government,
in the form of institutional grants to traditional distance education providers
such as the University of New England, and internal, one-off development
grants to academics wishing to develop on-line courses, cannot be allowed
to gloss over differences of interests. Staff members, while often interested
in the pedagogical potential of new technologies, are concerned at the im-
lications for workload, quality, and intellectual property. Institutional lead-
ers, and also governments, although hopefully now more cautious, still some-
times see on-line learning as a means to extend their market share in
international higher education, especially in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.
The real costs (both financial and in terms of additional work and stress for
staff members), as well as issues of quality, will need to be carefully
monitored.153

What has been argued and demonstrated thus far is that, far from a
simple increase in international activities in Australian universities in recent
years being based on a rise in values of internationalism, the internation-
alization of students, staff members, and programs were each underpinned by
the extension of market principles. In this sense, it can be argued that, to a
substantial extent, the internationalization of higher education in Australia
since the mid-1980s occurred because of globalization, rather than despite
it.

The Revolt against Globalization

The processes of globalization are by no means uncontested, however,
as events in Seoul, Melbourne, Seattle, and Genoa reveal.154 Indeed, increas-

152 “Call for a Virtual Watchdog,” Australian, November 9, 1998
153 For example, one of Australia’s largest distance education universities provides course lectures
on line via its library. Other than variable sound quality, however, the unavailability of any visual images
is also an issue.
154 See, among others, Gee et al. (n. 99 above); H-P. Martin and H. Schumann, The Global Trap:
ing scrutiny of the more invidious consequences of globalization, by both activists and social scientists, including from the field of education, as well as by political economists of development, is now finally spreading to mainstream economists and financial analysts concerned about the prospect of a world financial system that is increasingly out of control: “To the question ‘Who’s in charge of the Global economy?’ we now have an answer. Nobody.”

Globalization is increasingly under attack, even from former high priests of neoliberal economic orthodoxy. John Gray, for example, who, 20 years ago, provided much of the intellectual ammunition for Margaret Thatcher’s unrelenting attacks upon the postwar Keynesian welfare state, has publicly recanted his previous position and vigorously criticized the tendencies of globalization to widen the already massive chasm between rich and poor, both within and between nations, and to vastly increase social, political, and economic dislocation, inequality, and uncertainty. According to Edwards, and to an increasing number of social, political, and economic theorists, the disruptive, regressive, and fissiparous outcomes of globalization, allied with the fact that such activities are “beyond the reach of any democratic legislature,” together mean that “democracy and the free market are rivals, not allies.”

We have seen above how such critiques translate into the world of internationalizing higher education as we enter a new century in which there is no sign that the tidal wave of globalization is set to recede. If, as Lord Dearing argued recently, successful universities of the next century will have, as one of their defining characteristics, an internationalized institutional profile, one must ask what kind of internationalism this is, and at what cost is it to be achieved? The two questions are linked and indeed may be seen as the Janus face of change in higher education, with one side facing toward twentieth-century ideals of international cooperation, in the interests of a world order that supports peace and social justice, while the other side faces toward increasing integration of universities (and other public-sector institutions) into the world of deregulated global business, with its winner-take-all philosophy and antipathy to any restrictions upon so-called free trade.

It may well be that a university “[that] aspires to greatness among its fellows, and even more so, one that aspires to respond to the opportunities of the next decade, . . . will be increasingly international rather than national in its thinking,” as part of a world in which national borders are less and less meaningful. Nonetheless, the fact that, to achieve such international (or

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156 It has been calculated, e.g., that Bill Gates’s fortune is equivalent to the “combined net worth of the 106 million poorest Americans” (S. A. Khan, “Free Market Failures,” Newsweek, October 12, 1998, p. 24C).
more accurately, perhaps, global) success, universities will need to resort increasingly to increased reliance upon a contract, part-time, and casualized academic workforce,159 a relative reduction in academic salaries, reduced public funding for (basic) research, a commodification of education and knowledge, and an intensification of academic work is worrisome, not merely for staff members and students but for anyone concerned with maintaining the quality of higher education. Regrettably, this increasingly seems to exclude ministers of education.

Moreover, “partnerships with the communications and entertainment industry” are increasingly being entertained, particularly in the English-speaking world, in an effort to expand market share internationally.160 Such strategic partnerships occur both because such industries have forms of expertise the university sector often lacks and due to the massive call upon investment capital that such an enterprise demands, one well beyond the range of even wealthy universities.161 It gives cause for real concern, both about the corrosion of individual and university-wide autonomy, as well as the range and quality of the programs (or, as it is sometimes now termed, “product”) that may result. So, too, does the resulting further intensification of academic work, which seems a necessary corollary of the process and which further reduces the capacity for individual, collective, and systemwide critique.

Lord Dearing may well be correct in pointing out that the window of opportunity for universities to strike such deals with the infotainment industries may be quite short—only a decade or more. In this race against time, “the prizes will go to those institutions that, having seen the opportunity, move quickly, decisively, and with a disposition to welcome partnership with industry. . . . In this world of partnerships with employers, we have a new impetus to develop world class distance-learning materials; and if we do not, they and others will.”162

These two forces of internationalization and globalization, however, pull in very different directions, as was argued above, and it will be increasingly difficult for universities to reconcile these clearly competing agendas. Since it is apparent that, for the foreseeable future, Australian governments of either hue, like many of their counterparts overseas, will not redress the serious funding shortfall of the past decade and a half, the tensions of internation-


160 Mega corporations such as Newsorp, Disney, and Time Warner/AOL, in their quest for “content,” are actively embracing educational business partners in the form of university consortia, such as Universitas 21. See, among others, McLaren and Farahmandpur (n. 12 above); N. Witheford, “Cycles of Circuits and Struggles in High-Technology Capitalism,” in Cutting Edge: Technology Information and Capitalism and Social Revolution, ed. J. Davis, T. Hirschill, and M. Stack (London: Verso, 1997), pp. 195–242; Welch and Mok, “Conclusion: Deep Development or Deep Division?” (n. 22 above).

161 Years of underfunding means few are wealthy any longer.

162 Dearing, “The Full-on University,” p. 34.
alizing universities against a backdrop of globalization can only sharpen. Indeed, it is arguable that the current worldwide tidal wave of globomania threatens to engulf moves toward genuine internationalization of universities—in Australia, as elsewhere.